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Can Smart Defense work? A suggested approach to increasing risk- and burden-
sharing within NATO 
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen proposes “Smart Defense,” as 
NATO’s new approach to risk- and burden-sharing that “ensur[es] greater security, for 
less money, by working together with more flexibility”.1  As part of this approach, he 
promotes the pooling and sharing of defense capabilities
2
 based on the “right” priorities 
and better coordination of efforts.  In effect, Smart Defense seeks to address the issue of 
burden sharing in a climate of economic downturn by encouraging closer alignment and 
even interdependencies of defense spending and acquisitions among member nations.  
This is another attempt to address a chronic problem.  The issues surrounding alignment 
among member nations’ forces, the interoperability of NATO forces, and the notion of 
burden sharing have been present in the alliance since its inception, and scholarly articles 
are available dating back to the 1950s
3,4
. 
In this paper, we offer a possible strategy for making at least some of NATO’s 
Smart Defense initiative more likely to succeed.  Similar initiatives were tried as early as 
1952 – 
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 “In 1952, NATO leaders meeting in Lisbon agreed that the alliance needed 
 military capabilities equal to those of the Soviet bloc and that national 
 contributions should be based on a specialization of effort.”5 
Despite these agreements, initiatives resulting in more equitable burden sharing 
have never been fully implemented, and the debate on burden sharing continues.  It is 
important to recall the seminal study on the economics of alliances from 1966, and to 
realize that its insights have held for nearly 50 years and, in all probability, will hold in 
the future.  In regards to why some nations do not contribute their “fair share,” Olson and 
Zeckhauser found that smaller alliance members receive even smaller shares of total 
benefits from accruing collective defense, giving their leaders little or no incentive to 
provide more defense because they know that larger members will provide the amounts 
they want for themselves (p. 278).
6
 We believe that NATO leaders will be much more 
likely to succeed in collaborative efforts in situations where a country can reap at least 
some private (or national) net benefits of providing all or part of a capability. If NATO 
leaders adopt policies that focus on goods and services such as medical treatment 
capabilities, where marginal benefits can exceed marginal costs for individual nations, 
and where the perceived risks of further integration of military capabilities can be 
adequately addressed, they can increase pooling and sharing. To the extent that pooling 
and sharing results in improved efficiencies in resource use, member nations have more 
resources that could be used to provide greater security for all alliance members. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly 
clarify the economic foundations of alliance burden- and risk-sharing, explaining why 
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smaller countries are never likely to contribute their “fair share,” at least from an 
economic point of view, unless the alliance asks for the provision of goods with at least 
some private (national) benefits to the country. We then examine risk and risk factors 
associated with the decision to implement some of the strategies proposed in the Smart 
Defense initiative.
7
  We divide a nation’s total risk from NATO participation into two 
categories, alliance risk and capability risk, each of which can have positive or negative 
influences on the country leaders’ willingness to participate in particular ways within the 
alliance. We then examine three possible approaches to achieving cooperation and 
collaboration among NATO members: shared capability, partially shared capability, and 
specialization or comparative advantage in capability production and development. We 
describe the effect of risk factors on the likelihood of the success of each approach in 
different situations.  We follow this with our approach, in which member nations agree to 
provide support capabilities, again describing risk factors associated with this approach. 
We follow with a brief section on risk perception versus risk realities, and conclude by 
providing recommendations for improving NATO’s chances of success in increasing 
efficiency and effectiveness in providing collective defense. 
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 There is currently an active debate about the meanings and implications of the terms 
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military relations and the problem of risk, International Affairs 88: 2 (2012) 265–282; MJ 
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Economic foundations of burden- and risk-sharing 
With pressures of the world economic situation affecting national budgets, we 
expect NATO leaders to find it difficult to gain increased cooperation in sharing and 
pooling capabilities in the near future.  There is a general feeling that “…US calls for 
European allies to increase their defense spending will probably remain fruitless.  NATO 
therefore still lacks a sustainable burden-sharing model.”8 
We do not intend in this paper to examine the effect of declining budgets on 
defense on a country or alliance basis. Rather, we attempt to review concepts and present 
approaches that could improve the situation, even in times of more constrained economic 
resources. 
Our first observation is that NATO leaders have either forgotten, or, two 
generations later, never learned the economic theory of alliances. Olson and Zeckhauser’s 
seminal article on the economics of alliances provides the economic basis for 
understanding why alliance members choose to provide less of a collective public good, 
like common defense, than is Pareto-optimal, and more of public goods that accrue 
private benefits to the funding member.
9
 In the case of common defense, smaller alliance 
members receive even smaller shares of total benefits from accruing collective defense, 
thus, they have little or no incentive to provide more defense knowing that larger 
members will provide the amounts they want for themselves
10
.  Nearly fifty years later, 
research continues to bear out this result. Amara’s empirical analysis found the model 
still holds: “The newer states joining NATO can expect to enjoy the benefits of the 
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security provided by NATO without having to modify their national defense interests or 
pay a commensurate share of defense costs to defense benefits received from being 
members of an alliance”11. Thus, NATO leaders need to remind themselves that the 
burdens for collective public goods have been and likely always will be shared in a 
disproportionate way, even with complete agreement among alliance members as to 
needed capabilities.  
In some situations, however, economics suggests different policy approaches to 
address the disproportionality and sub-optimality of member support by changing 
incentives. In the case of the provision of quasi-public goods with private, non-collective 
benefits, such as medical, transport or logistics functions, NATO leaders can provide 
incentives to members to provide as much or more of their share because their nations 
receive benefits not otherwise received in providing strictly collective public goods:  
 “Alliances and international organizations, as presently organized, will 
not work efficiently, or according to any common conception of fairness, 
however complete the agreement and community of interest among the 
members. […] some differences of purpose may improve the working of an 
alliance, because they increase the private, non-collective benefits from 





When alliance members perceive that participation in these quasi-public goods yields 
marginal benefits in excess of marginal costs, as can be the case with some types of 
national contributions to the alliance, they willingly provide them. This was the case for 
early negotiations and sharing agreements for providing NATO infrastructure: “The 
NATO nations determine through negotiation what percentages of any infrastructure 
                                                        
11
 Jomana Amara, NATO defense expenditures: Common goals or diverging interests? A 
structural analysis, Defence and Peace Economics, 2008, 449-69. p. 467. 
12
 Olson and Zeckhauser, An economic theory of alliances, 1966, p279. 
 6 
expenditure each member will pay, and this sharing of marginal costs has led the smaller 
members to bear a very much larger share of the infrastructure burden than they do of the 
other NATO burdens”.13 In today’s NATO, the provision of many support functions and 
services share characteristics of infrastructure. Medical, maintenance, and supply chain 
inputs (presumably supporting national military or industrial needs) provide just a few 
examples of cases where different NATO policies could alleviate sub-optimality and 
disproportionality, providing more efficiency and effectiveness in the allocation of scarce 
member resources. Applied to the right goods and services, this approach should increase 
the common defense and be a more efficient way to achieve “fairness” in pooling and 
sharing of resources.  
 
Analysis of risks and risk factors affecting success of Smart Defense 
In addition to economic concerns, member nations also consider risk implications 
of an integrated, combined defense. Given the many possible definitions and 
interpretations of the term “risks,” we use the definition as set forth by the Society for 
Risk Analysis. This definition was made more explicit by Kaplan and Garrick, who 
described risk as the response to a series of three questions - (i) What can happen? (i.e., 
What can go wrong?)  (ii) How likely is it that that will happen? (iii) If it does happen, 
what are the consequences? (And consequently what utility value do we assign to 
them?).
14
  This implies that a threat exists, there is uncertainty as to whether or not the 
threat will be realized, and there are consequences associated with the realization of the 
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threat.  This definition applies equally well to analysis of the Cold War as it does to the 
War on Terror. 
The first and arguably most paramount risk is whether or not the alliance will hold 
when severely tested. Yost notes that this is an active concern of some members: 
“Allies such as Poland and the Baltic states have been and remain less concerned 
about the military capability of the alliance to deploy […] than about the political 
will of some allies to honour their Article V commitments in a serious crisis.”15  
 
However, even if this paramount risk can be addressed, numerous other sources of 
uncertainty and risk may influence a country’s willingness to combine and share defense 
resources. The risks can have a favorable or detrimental influence and can be combined 
into two broad categories. We refer to the first category as “alliance risk,” which occurs 
simply because a member nation belongs to the alliance. Alliance risk includes external 
risk; the risk that alliance members feel more protected than by acting alone, but expose 
themselves to the full spectrum of threats faced by each member nation; and within 
country risks, including concerns associated with sovereignty, economics, and politics. 
The second category, “capability risk,” refers to risks in developing and deploying 
a capability itself. These include classic time, schedule and performance risks 
surrounding the life cycle – research and development, production, use and retiring – of 
new or modified capabilities, and also affect different countries’ leaders’ views of the 
likelihood of successful acquisition and implementation. 
Yost suggests: 
“[…] allies may face increasing political fragmentation, continued 
inadequate defence spending, more shortfalls in meeting commitments to 
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 David S Yost, NATO’s evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept, International 
Affairs, 86: 2 (2010) 489–522, p498. 
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operations and NRF [NATO response force] rotations, and uncertainties 






External risks present situations where member nations form, join and continue to 
participate in an alliance.  However, each member nation perceives a different set of 
threats based on its geographic location and view of primary causes of national threats.  
For example, Baltic nations still view Russian encroachment as a primary risk, 
southeastern European nations judge regional conflicts as a primary risk, while the U.S. 
sees Islamic militants and other terrorist organizations as a primary risk.
17,18 ,19
 The 
diverse nature of the risks that NATO is committed to address is evident in the Lisbon 
Summit Declaration of 2010.
20
  This wide diversity of external sources of risk leads to 
different goals and priorities of individual member nations. 
21, 22,  23, 24
  It also leads to 
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differences in response and intervention in external situations such as Kosovo and Iraq.
25
 




  It is 
not obvious that the same or even similar capabilities can support all member nations’ 
needs and, therefore, individual national leaders will support the development of only a 
subset of NATO’s complete list of desired capabilities. 
Intra-alliance risks 
In addition to external risks, member nations must also confront the risk posed 
just by belonging to the alliance.  Article V requires a unified response to an attack on 
any member nation. Therefore, if a member nation is attacked, all nations are attacked 
and must respond. This principle was reconfirmed as the cornerstone of NATO policy at 
the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit meeting.
29
  The logic behind this approach, of course, 
was and is that guaranteed, overwhelming and forceful responses serve to deter those 
who would attack, thereby dramatically reducing the likelihood of attack on a member 
nation. However, the threat of such a response does not necessarily deter attacks. 
Especially in the most recent years, in which the world has seen a rise in internationally 
capable terrorist organizations, rogue states, and small independent actors/factions, it is 
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not clear that the threat of overwhelming force deters aggression. These small, nimble, 
and sometimes only loosely connected organizations have gained great power and status 
by attacking nations with larger forces.  They complete their missions using non-
traditional means that they believe (correctly or incorrectly) make them secure from 
reprisal. Therefore, each member nation receives some benefit by having the alliance 
lessen the risk of its primary threats but at the same time increases “intra-alliance” risk by 




Each member nation also faces risks within its own country. Some national 
leaders view additional cooperation and integration as threats to national sovereignty. 
Leaders may hold inherent concerns about relying on other countries to protect their own. 
Joining an alliance does not obviate the need of country leaders and citizens to feel secure 
in their country’s ability to respond to aggression without having to convince their allies 
of an impending threat requiring immediate military response. National leaders’ instincts 
will be to invest in capabilities critical to maintaining national sovereignty, and they 
generally prefer to ensure the use of these capabilities without reliance on alliance 
partners.
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
  When national leaders see misalignment of interests or views of 
risk and the threat environment, their responses likely exacerbate the situation.
39, 40
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Internal economic and political risks also put pressure on a government’s leaders 
to decrease contributions to an alliance. As national and international economies continue 
to fluctuate, national leaders may find it difficult to honor funding commitments to 
entities outside the nation because of internal funding needs. They may also find that 
political pressures require changes in policy in contributing to the alliance. Over time, 
U.S. leaders have frequently spared the U.S. military from painful budget cuts; however, 
this pattern is likely to change. In general, leaders cut defense budgets when economic 
and/or political pressures require them to do so.  Many European countries have cut 
defense budgets to less than 2% of GDP.
41
  Only five of 28 NATO allies meet NATO 
spending requirements.
42
  The economic risks are two-fold.  The risk of underfunding 
defense may result in providing inadequate defense and security to the country, which 
may translate to an underfunding of defense commitments to the alliance. This, in turn, 
increases the risk that the alliance may dissolve.  
"The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling (U.S.) appetite and patience ... to 
expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently 
unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be 
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Risk also affects the construction of the capability itself: the classic time, schedule 
and performance risks surrounding the life cycle – research and development, production, 
use and retiring – of new or modified capabilities exist for an alliance, and increase 
uncertainty relative to life cycle development and deployment risk in a national context. 
Capabilities development initiatives in the U.S. in the past decades such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter, the littoral combat ship, and the air tanker refueler show that capability 
development has significant risks of cost overruns, schedule delays and performance 
failings. Depending on characteristics of the capability alliance leaders desire, member 
nations’ leaders may view the likelihood of successful acquisition and implementation 
very differently and will modify their behavior accordingly. Relative to some of the 
alliance risks noted in the sections above, however, perhaps these development and 
implementation risks can be more easily identified and (in some cases) addressed. Most 
countries have organizations that analyze military research and development, acquisition, 
technology and logistics functions, with the goal of increasing efficiency and 
effectiveness in the development and deployment of new or modified capabilities.  In the 
US, this effort is headed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)).
44
  The same functions are performed in 
NATO by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), which is 
responsible for discussing defense procurement in NATO member and Partner countries 




to consider the political, economic and technical aspects of the development and 




The combination of alliance and capability risks results in a total, unique, country-
specific risk perceived by the population of each member country. Typically, intra-
alliance factors directly influence each other: to tease apart the influence diagram (shown 
at a macro-level in Figure A) would require a complete model of socio-economic-
political processes within each member nation and individual member leaders’ risk 
perceptions and preferences for their countries.  It is not our intention to create such a 
model, but rather to ascertain how the amalgamation of these risks influences the 
country-specific leaders’ perceptions that the alliance will function in the way it was 
envisioned at its creation or time of joining. This allows us to examine total risk in a 
global sense, dividing it into the risk that a capability can be developed and will work as 
desired (capability risk) plus the risk that the alliance holds so that capabilities developed 
in partnership are available to each member nation. 
Figure A: Total Risk = Alliance Risk + Capability Risk 
 





Total risk perception directly interacts with the Smart Defense initiative and may 
well influence how a nation’s leaders react to requests for commitments to NATO 
capability development plans.  Smart Defense “encourages Allies to cooperate in 
developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities. […] That means pooling and 
sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better.”46  In the face of our 
noted economic disincentives and multiple types of risk, how do NATO leaders begin to 
achieve cooperation and collaboration? 
 
Approaches to cooperation and collaboration 
Several possible ways exist to achieve desired cooperation and collaboration 
among member nations. We examine three in this section then propose a fourth, our 
approach, in the final section of this paper.   


























Partnerships in development and deployment: The shared capability approach 
First, national leaders can develop, acquire, and field a capability with a set of 
partner nations wherein each partner contributes to the costs and can receive the total 
benefit, at some given time, of the final capability.  For example, this could mean that one 
country produces the frame of an aircraft, another provides the avionics, and a third 
provides the engines. The underlying agreement in this case must be that the other 
partners will make the capability, no matter where located, available as needed. In effect, 
partners directly share the capability, and we might call this the “shared capability 
approach.” With this approach, each partner faces both parts of the total risk function.   
The capability risks when partners develop and ensure functionality of a 
capability exceed those posed when one country develops the capability on its own.  This 
is due to the increased number of member nations, and their contractors, working to 
develop the capability, and the increased number of functions the system is expected to 
fulfill.  Capability risk also accrues due to possible differences in standards, 
measurements, and construction specifications. All of these situations increase the 






“An official UK study estimated that total development costs on collaborative 
projects were between some 140% and almost 200% higher than for comparable 
national programmes, depending on the number of partners. … and that 
cooperation may cause an average of 11 months' delay.” 49 
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Joint capability owners take on more alliance risk than countries that produce a 
capability by itself. With joint owners, each nation faces an increased likelihood (or 
uncertainty about whether) one of the other partners, under internal pressure, will 
abandon its responsibility to provide part of the capability. This can result in reduced or 
eliminated viability of the capability as a whole unless the other partners can reach an 
agreement on how to reapportion the part (or funding for the part) of the capability 
abandoned. 
Finally, also in the category of alliance risk, location of capability components 
and possible simultaneous need for a specific, partner-produced capability increases risk 
to each partner nation. Where will the systems and units that make up the capability be 
located? Does one partner control more of the capability than another, giving its leaders 
power to exclude another country if it feels its own need for the capability exceeds its 
partners’?  If two partners need the capability simultaneously, which partner will use the 
capability first?  Will the other (or perhaps more than one) partner suffer more than minor 
consequences by waiting? Should a stalemate occur, the capability may have reduced or 
no viability until the partner leaders can resolve the issue to the satisfaction of all 
partners. This is because any partner in possession of a component system or unit could 
withhold its contribution to the capability, potentially rendering it non-functional. The 
delays imposed by answering these questions increase alliance risk. 
In order for the shared capability approach to work, the partners need a natural, 
close allegiance to each other, to be geographically close to each other (or time-located 
by transport, or connected electronically, depending on the capability), be unable or 
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unwilling to create the capability on their own, and desire the capability strongly enough 
to overcome the negative potential consequences of the risks. 
Individual development and collaborative deployment: The partially shared capability 
approach 
A second approach to cooperation and collaboration occurs when member nations 
agree to develop and maintain a weapons system, trained unit or other good or service 
that, when pooled with other members’ systems, provides a full capability. In these cases, 
members have different components or smaller or larger parts of the greater capability 
that can function on their own. For example, a member may agree to provide some 
number of tracked vehicles to the alliance when requested. The tracked vehicles form a 
key component of a greater alliance capability, and may serve to meet the member’s 
agreements to provide resources to the alliance. However, the vehicles also provide an 
existing capability that can be used by the nation for other needs (such as transportation 
in disaster relief scenarios). We might call this the “partially-shared capability approach,” 
which provides a self-standing component of the whole capability that can have multiple 
additional purposes.  With this approach, each partner faces both parts of the total risk 
function, but the magnitude of this risk has been lessened when compare to the shared 
capability approach. 
Alliance risk is lowered in several ways.  While a member’s leaders may procure 
and maintain a system not necessarily at the top of their in-country list of defense needs, 
they produce a fully functional capability that they may show to their own constituents as 
the immediate national output of their investment.  In addition, if the system can be 
shown to provide national benefits from developing, maintaining, and potentially using 
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the asset, the member nation experiences in-country benefits, lowering in-country risk 
and, thus, alliance risk.  
Additionally, and unlike the situation where partners develop and deploy 
capabilities together, individual ownership of functional capability components lessens 
the relative intra-alliance risk. Besides building up in-country assets, the country has 
direct control over the development and assembly of that component. This control 
provides the sense that all partners of the shared capability have an equal say in the 
deployment of the full capability since the components are not concentrated in any one 
country.  Alliance risk remains however, because to have a fully functional capability, 
each partner must agree to provide its components when requested to do so and continue 
the maintenance and support actions required to ensure that their part remains functional.  
Otherwise, the capability will be diminished. 
In terms of capability risk, there is some mitigation due to the fact that one 
country is responsible for developing a functional capability.  However, interoperability 
uncertainties among the different components provided by the countries remain.
50
 If all of 
the functional components from each member nation cannot be well integrated to provide 
the full capability, capability risk, while different from the shared capability approach, 
still exists. One could certainly surmise that interoperability risks in the case of functional 
components as proposed in this section are lower than interoperability risks when 
multiple partners develop the capability as a group, as in the previous section.  
As was the case in the previous section, for the partially-shared capability 
approach to work, the partners need to have a natural, close allegiance to each other, be 
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geographically close to each other (or, again, time-located by transport, or connected 
electronically, depending on the capability), be unable or unwilling to create the 
capability on their own, and desire the capability strongly enough to overcome the 
negative potential consequences of the risks.  
The specialization or comparative advantage capability approach 
A third option is for a country to specialize and focus on providing the full 
capability in one, smaller, contained area (such as the Joint Chemical, Biological, 
Radiation, and Nuclear Defence Center of Excellence established by the Czech 
Republic).  This specialization or comparative advantage approach minimizes capability 
risk because the member nation develops the entire capability; no interoperability risks 
exist. It also alleviates certain portions of alliance risk: the member owns the full 
capability regardless of the status of the alliance.  
In this situation, different alliance risks come into play.  If the provider nation is a 
smaller member of the alliance, it may be the case that producing the full capability 
requires a substantial portion of the total available defense budget, which reduces the 
amount of funds that the nation can spend on its own defense forces.  While the member 
provides a valuable service to the alliance, in this situation it may become even more 
dependent on the alliance for protection of its sovereignty.  In this case, the strength of 
the alliance becomes paramount to the provider nation. The overall net effect on the 
alliance risk may be beneficial or detrimental. 
In addition, as the capability provided is specialized, it may not always be needed 
by the alliance and the alliance may not fully value the provider nation’s contribution.  If 
the capability is critical, often times larger members of the alliance may choose to 
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develop a duplicate capability as they may not wish to rely on the availability of the 
alliance’s asset in times of crisis.  For larger countries, Olson and Zeckhauser’s theories 
likely apply: large enough countries will provide what they want for themselves.
51
   
For smaller countries, if this approach were to work, the specialized capability 
would need to be small enough for one country to fully provide yet important enough for 
the alliance as a whole to recognize the contribution of this capability as a vital asset. 
 
Sharing support functions: An alternative to sharing capabilities 
At the outset, NATO leaders proposed Smart Defense to improve the use of 
scarce economic resources and to generate efficient and effective military capabilities 
that address threats to the alliance.  In this section, we propose a fourth approach for 
better achieving cooperation and collaboration among member nations.  
By analyzing the economic reasoning for participating in the alliance (and the 
burden-sharing levels), and risks associated with different types of commitments, we 
believe NATO leaders’ Smart Defense focus should change. NATO leaders’ negotiations 
should scale back from pressuring member nations to contribute by partnering in the 
generation of independent, offensive capabilities. Specifically, we propose that NATO 
leaders and military planners focus first on capabilities that function as dependent 
programs, i.e. capabilities that serve the “tail” rather than the “tooth” of military 
operations. While we recognize this practice currently exists, we suggest exploiting this 
approach more broadly rather than continuing to push for increased partnering in the 
development and deployment of weapons systems and other force-producing capabilities.  
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By increasing commitment to pool and share support functions among the 
member nations, NATO leaders can negotiate more agreements of benefit to the alliance 
and all its members. This approach introduces some different intra-alliance risks, but 
should lower total risk and increase efficiency and effectiveness, making policies based 
on it more likely to succeed in helping NATO leaders achieve their goals.  
When a member country provides a support capability, it nearly eliminates risk 
related to development and implementation of the capability because it is fully produced 
within the country. For example, a country can train, equip, man and sustain medical, 
logistics, transport or military police units alone. Further reducing capability risk, many 
support capabilities require very little to no interoperability: relative to interoperability 
risk with offensive capabilities, the standalone nature of “tail” functions should make it 
easier for alliance members to work jointly. In addition, the alliance should experience 
shorter time lags in combining support functions with offensive, operational missions 
because part of the member’s commitment to meeting alliance needs should include 
member responsibility to provide committed support capabilities at acceptable readiness 
levels with minimal (and stipulated) lead time.  In total, member nations and the alliance 
lower their capability risk from committing to provide and accept standalone support 
functions. 
This approach should also reduce alliance risk to all members, not just those 
providing support capabilities. If NATO leaders increase the opportunities for a member 
nation to contribute capabilities with greater in-country utility, they improve both in-
country efficiency in the use of resources and alliance burden-sharing. Individual 
countries understand and plan for their own medical, logistic, transport and other support 
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capabilities because they understand their own internal threats, from military to natural 
disasters. Their leaders understand security needs for these capabilities and tend to be on 
board with using resources to pay for them. (These authors found not a single citation 
wherein a country’s leaders argue that their country has too many doctors or nurses.) 
Where NATO leaders can better align requests for contributions with a country’s 
higher-priority capabilities, perhaps those not even directly supported with defense 
funding in country, they will be more successful in acquiring them, at lower cost to the 
alliance. Thus, a member nation’s choice to allocate resources to support functions allows 
the nation to accrue greater private benefits, decreasing its intra-alliance risk.  
Some member countries experience political hurdles in procuring weapons or 
serving in offensive roles.  Both NATO and the European Union have expressed concern 
over the impact of national caveats such as those that limit the use of troops to specific 
activities, specific regions, only non-combative roles, etc.
52
 Our approach allows more 
countries (and possibly more commitments from single countries) to provide support 
capabilities, allowing country leaders to avoid controversy over direct fighting or 
participation in offensive missions. In general, members who provide these capabilities 
gain alliance support and “good press,” without being implicated in civilian casualties or 
friendly-fire incidents, and tend to suffer fewer casualties. In addition, because support 
capabilities serve dual functions, both in support of the alliance and in support of the 
providing country, national leaders should find internal consensus and commitment easier 
to achieve. Member constituents recognize the utility of some support capabilities, so 
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they should be less likely to find a single component of the capability (such as a multi-
billion dollar jet) to challenge, decreasing political wrangling over wasted funds. In sum, 
national leaders should find reaching internal consensus and commitment to providing 
support capabilities easier to obtain. It follows that the alliance, in turn, receives greater 
commitment in terms of resources, as smaller nations provide a much larger share of the 
burden than they would with operational, offensive weapons systems.  This increases the 
pooling and sharing, although in different terms than NATO leaders currently suggest, of 
resources, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the alliance. 
One might question how providers of offensive capabilities, i.e., countries intent 
on supplying and maintaining the “tooth,” view this approach. In fact, this approach 
offers several benefits. Supplying support capabilities for each offensive capability 
requires large and expensive undertakings in training, manning and equipping support 
units. If countries like the U.S. with no plans to abandon their offensive posture feel 
comfortable relying upon other members to provide support capabilities for certain 
missions, they can experience an increase in resource availability. This case occurs if the 
“tooth” country uses or maintains some amount of support capability for its own, private 
use, and can benefit by not providing “extra” support for alliance missions. In today’s 
economy, even the largest, most powerful countries see the advantages of relying on 
smaller partners to provide logistic, transport, medical and other functions in periods of 
crisis. Two keys to success exist: First, do “tooth” country leaders trust member nations 
to support them in alliance missions?  Second, do “tooth” countries feel they must 
increase the size and strength of their support functions when they take part in actions 
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with the alliance? If the answer to either question is “no,” NATO has less power to make 
an economic argument to offer in pursuing this approach.   
However, if “tooth” countries use the resources made available from transferring 
funds away from support functions, they can procure and maintain more offensive 
capabilities, both for private uses and in support of the alliance. This argument increases 
the power of NATO negotiation in situations where “tooth” countries see a way to use it.  
In addition, “tooth” countries frequently support national defense industrial complexes 
and wish to maintain control over technology developments. By transferring or partially 
transferring support functions to other member nations, “tooth” countries can continue to 
support their industries without requesting additional funds or requesting industries in 
member countries to work jointly. Leaders in “tooth” countries can then pursue more 
economical (and potentially effective) strategies for life cycle investments with their own 
industries. 
We believe the support capability approach would serve to build a stronger 
alliance. Economic theory, empirical analysis, and time have shown that smaller 
organizations will not contribute their “fair share” to providing offensive capabilities.  
From an economic point of view, they may contribute more than their share when private 
benefits accrue; private benefits are more likely to be generated when developing support 
functions that can serve a dual purpose in-country. If member nations provide more 
funding for support capabilities, the overall level of funding should increase and there 
will be a more “equitable” sharing of the burden – one of the primary goals of Smart 
Defense.  In addition, this approach lowers total risk to many member nations and 
generates reliance among allies that is hard to untangle: greater dependency among allies 
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may increase Smart Defense, and thus NATO’s likelihood of survival. NATO leadership 
can address intra-alliance and capability risks within the alliance setting by educating 
members and altering incentives. Resolving these issues will be critical to the future 
functioning of the alliance.   
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
In this paper, we offer a possible strategy for making NATO’s Smart Defense 
initiative more likely to succeed. This follows the economic theory of alliances in which 
marginal costs and marginal benefits calculations can result in more “fair” burden sharing 
with acceptable levels of risk to member nations. 
The model developed here suggests that the problems of disproportionality and 
suboptimality in international organizations should be met instead through 
institutional changes that alter the pattern of incentives. Since suboptimal 
provision is typical of international organizations, it is possible to design policy 
changes that would leave everyone better off, and which accordingly may have 
some change of adoption. Appropriate marginal cost sharing schemes, such as are 
now used to finance the NATO infrastructure, could solve the problem of 





Rather than aiming for group (or at least partnership) consensus on the production of 
capabilities, we suggest focusing on interoperability through support functions. This 
approach provides the most likely solution for connecting the forces, doctrine, 
procedures, standards and other factors of joint capability production such that country 
leaders find the risks of doing so to be politically and militarily acceptable.  
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